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The Frasier Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) (Gwartney, J. Hall, and 
Lawson 2010) is a well-cited metric “economic freedom.” Many analysts have used the index to 
assess the effects of laissez faire policies.  I argue that the EFW is not strictly a measure of 
market capitalism, but rather an amalgam of at least two distinct though related but distinct 
concepts: economic liberalism and good governance.  The conflation of these concepts could 
present problems for analysts who use the EFW to evaluate laissez-faire policies’ effects. 
The paper begins with a review of the EFW and its use in the scholastic literature.  It then 
discusses the possible conceptual blending implicit in the index’s measurement.  Using 
confirmatory factor analysis, I show that its Legal Structure and Property Rights component 
lacks discriminant validity from “governance quality”, a concept developed to condition 
orthodox free market reform prescriptions (reviewed in Burki and Perry 1998).  Finally, I show 
via cluster analysis that, while the rich world is both relatively liberal and well-governed, the 
advanced postindustrial economies exhibit different mixtures of both.  Prescribing reforms that 
maximize both liberalism and governance is tantamount to recommending that countries 
embrace an Anglo model of capitalism.  Alternative models exist, and policy-makers have reason 
to entertain them. 
 A failure to distinguish the EFW’s conceptually distinct components ignores important 
concerns about reform sequencing, obfuscates their individual contributions to economic 
welfare, and fails to consider the possibility that governance and liberalism can work at cross-
purposes in countries’ pursuit of development.  Analyses of the EFW should remain cognizant of 
this conceptual blending when using the index to devise policy prescriptions. 
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1. The EFW Index’s Content and Meaning 
The EFW’s authors define economic freedom as occurring where an economy is 
characterized by “personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and security of 
privately owned property” (Gwartney et al. 2010:v).  Discussions of “economic freedom” are 
often employed in debates about the desirability of policies that prioritize unfettered private 
markets versus government interventionism (for reviews, see Berggren 2003; De Haan, 
Lundström, and Sturm 2006).  Scholars explicitly treat the EFW as a measure of “free markets” 
(Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2006), a “market economy” (Berggren 2003), “liberalization” 
(De Haan et al. 2006), “neoliberal” economies (Tures 2003) or some cognate concept that 
suggests laissez-faire capitalism.    I argue that the EFW is an amalgam of laissez-faire and at 
least one other concept.  The index’s Legal Structure & Property Rights component is 
conceptually distinct from the EFW’s other constituent measures, and signals the importance of 
“governance” (Burki and Perry 1998) concerns.   
1.1: What is Meant by “Economic Freedom” Precisely?  
To see what is meant specifically by “economic freedom”, it is useful to see how the 
concept is measured.  Economic freedom scores represent the average of five sub-indices, each 
of which is intended to capture some constituent aspect of the overall concept.  The index has 
undergone many revisions since its introduction in 1996, and its current formulation is 
summarized below in Table 1: 
[Insert Table 1] 
The index is taken to capture a particular kind of freedom, whereby non-state actors’ 
decisions are not affected by government prerogatives.  If these constituent measures of 
“freedom” are accepted as ideals that policy-makers are being specifically advised to embrace, 
then the index can be understood as providing commentary on the effectiveness of major pro-
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market reform initiatives of the late-20th century.  They bear great semblance to the tenets of the 
Williamson’s (1990) “Washington Consensus” (De Haan et al. 2006), and involve reforms that 
were pushed by the 1989 Brady Plan (Edwards 1995), post-Soviet collapse “shock therapy” 
(Kolodko 2000) or early-1990s IMF conditionality (Polak 1991).  As such, the EFW defines 
“economic freedom” along the same lines as the broad-based, late-20th century movement that is 
often described as “neoliberalism” (Harvey 2005; Centeno and Cohen forth.) or “market reform” 
(Edwards 1995; Rodrik 1996; Yergin and Stanislaw 2002). 
The literature that employs this index principally concentrates on the statistical 
relationship between EFW overall “freedom” scores and some metric of macroeconomic 
performance (like economic growth, poverty or longevity).  Much of it focuses on 
methodological concerns involved in assessing these relationships, for example on matters 
related to statistical controls (especially the use of sensitivity analysis), assessing Granger 
causality or instrumentation.  When studies treat the EFW as a measure of “freedom” in the 
sense of laissez-faire policy, they are taking the index’s self-description at face value. 
Three of the five sub-indices clearly rate countries as being “free” to the extent that 
governments limit their attempts to steer domestic economic activity, and accept whatever 
economic outcomes emerge from private activity.  Their suggestion of limited government 
intervention is reasonably straightforward: less government taxes and government-directed 
economic allocation (the Size of Government index), reduced government-imposed restrictions 
on international transacting (the Freedom to Trade index), or less regulation (the Regulation of 
Credit, Labor and Business index) all directly imply a government that is taking a more “hands-
off” approach to economic management.   
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The Access to Sound Money component can also be understood as reflecting limited 
government in some senses.  Money supply growth can be understood as an implicit tax on 
money holders (e.g., Sumner 2004).  Easing restrictions on access to foreign-denominated bank 
accounts is a straightforward case of deregulation.  The sub-index’s use of low and invariant 
inflation as a marker of is more problematic (also noted in Heckelman and Stroup 2000) because 
inflation is a policy outcome – like growth or unemployment – and not a policy itself.  There are 
cases when inflation could conceivably be aggravated by liberal policy, for example in the case 
of internationally-transmitted inflation or currency pressures to trade- and external finance-
dependent economies.  The issue is bracketed henceforth. 
The fifth sub-index, the Legal Structure & Property Rights component, is often treated as 
constitutive of “economic freedom” on the grounds that it represents a structural condition 
required for markets to work well.  Below, I argue that this sub-index is related to laissez-faire, 
but remains conceptually distinct.  However, most analyses do not strongly distinguish this sub-
index from other EFW components. 
Previous Efforts to Deconstruct the EFW.  Some studies have sought to decompose the 
EFW, recognizing the possibility that “freedom” does not represent a unitary theoretical 
construct.  Two strategies are often employed in such analyses: (1) the assessment of EFW 
constituent sub-indexes’ individual relationships with economic outcomes in isolation or net of 
each other, or (2) the use of exploratory factor analysis to assess differences in the underlying 
constructs captured by these measures.  Studies that have attempted to parse out the individual 
relationships between EFW constituent indexes and macroeconomic outcomes have focused on 
economic growth and produced mixed results.  Ayal and Karras (1998) find Access to Sound 
Money measures to often predict growth rates reasonably well, and some evidence that free trade 
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and small government measures could be important.  Carlsson and Lundström (2002) and 
Berggren and Jordahl (2005) suggest that the index’s Legal Structure & Property Rights and 
Access to Sound Money are strong predictors of growth.  Justesen (2008) argues that small 
government and deregulation are most important.   
Caudill, Zanella and Mixon (2000) attempt to disaggregate and reconstitute the EFW via 
exploratory factor analysis, which reconceptualizes the EFW as involving four factors – Free 
Enterprise, Stable Domestic Money, Government Size and International Monetary Freedom – a 
relatively modest recasting of the index.  It does not render categories that probe the ultimate 
validity of the index’s use as a metric of free market capitalism.  Their analysis did not consider 
potential problems with the Legal Structure component because it had not yet been developed 
when the study was conducted.  A study like that of Claudill and colleages on current data would 
probably lead to substantively similar results in any case.  A factor analysis that only uses EFW 
data fails to expose the Legal Structure index to a test for discriminant validity (Campbell and 
Fiske 1959) – tests for a substantial difference between what it is supposed to measure 
(economic liberty) and outside measures intended to capture a different concept (like good 
governance). 
The Legal Structure and Property Rights Component.  The Legal Structure & Property 
Rights sub-index is somewhat distinct conceptually.  Its constituent measures are not concerned 
with limiting government intervention, but are included because they constitute an essential 
“protective function” that provides “the foundation for both economic freedom and the efficient 
operation of markets” (Gwartney et al. 2010:5).  These are not the negative freedoms that 
constitute the index’s purported underlying concept of freedom, but rather a “positive” freedom 
whereby governments provide essential services that secure people’s need for contract 
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enforcement, order and conflict resolution.  Ultimately, they involve taxation, government 
appropriation and the exercise of government power, all of which suggest less private 
determination over economic outcomes.   
This sub-index can be understood as part of a broader policy initiative that need not 
imply more market capitalism.  Instead, it can be understood as signaling the concept of “good 
governance”, reforms that concentrate on making governments accountable, orderly, professional 
and non-corrupt (Burki and Perry 1998; Evans and Rauch 1999).  Governance and liberalism 
often coincide empirically, as the world’s wealthier countries are generally both better-governed 
and more liberal.  However, dramatic reforms in governance or liberalization need not involve 
commensurately dramatic reforms in the other, and the maximization of one does not imply the 
maximization of the other.  Indeed, there are reasons to believe that they are two distinct steps in 
a sequence, and many analysts have argued that governance concerns should be addressed before 
going too far with liberalism (Roland 2001; Staehr 2005).  If governance and liberalism are not 
separated conceptually, these possibilities will not even be entertained.  Below, I argue that, 
although liberalization and good governance are related, they constitute different concepts, and 
the EFW’s Legal System & Property Rights index pertains more closely to the latter. 
So What?  At first glance, one might dismiss the importance of distinguishing 
governance from liberalism in discussions involving economic freedom and policy.  After all, if 
someone believes that freer markets are necessary for the development of an effective market 
economy, and has no objection to forms of intervention that do make markets possible, then what 
is the big deal? 
There are several problems with a failure to distinguish between the two concepts.  The 
first involves questions as to what drives the relationship between growth and “economic 
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freedom.”  Insofar as the EFW’s authors are concerned – and many researchers who share their 
views – “economic freedoms” constituent are part of a larger common process that governments 
should seek to maximize.  However, if previous studies that stress the importance of the Legal 
Structure or Sound Money sub-indexes are right (Ayal and Karras 1998; Carlsson and Lundström 
2002; Berggren and Jordahl 2005), then questions arise as to which post-Cold War reforms 
actually improved the world’s growth rates during the 1990s and 2000s.  The world’s 
governments embraced free market reforms in the late-1980s and early-1990s, but also 
democratization and governance reform.  In a separate paper (Cohen 2011), I show that only the 
Legal Structure index and inflation rates predict growth rates after 1995.  Once countries 
removed their most egregious forms of market interference, there appear to be no further benefits 
to market liberalization (i.e., “freedom” net of governance and price stabilization.  Researchers 
who fail to appreciate the differences between liberalism and governance implicit in the EFW 
may miss these possibilities in studies that link “freedom” to other macroeconomic outcomes. 
When we bundle governance, laissez-faire and price stabilization into one concept, we 
impart the impression that they all have the same economic consequences, and should be 
implemented as a single, holistic reform program.  There are reasons to doubt that their 
economic consequences are all the same, and that they should be implemented all at once.  The 
conceptual conflation involved in the EFW communicates policy choices in a way that 
obfuscates either problem.  Analyses that do not differentiate between the EFW’s constituent 
concepts cannot begin to engage the issue of reform sequencing empirically.  Furthermore, 
bundling these concepts does not allow us to assess whether there are different returns to free 
markets versus better governance, nor to engage the possibility that governance and liberalism 
can work at cross-purposes (e.g., too much democracy yields excessive public spending and 
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fiscal imprudence,  over-liberalization can produce political effects that make the political 
system more unequal, and so on).  The EFW imparts an economic worldview that presents all the 
world’s leading economies as following the same set of policy principles, and they do not.   
2. Methods 
The analysis sets forth two goals.  First, , it establishes that the EFW’s implicit suggestion 
that countries maximize liberalism – rather than governance - is advising them to emulate the 
national economic policies of the Anglo OECD, and not all rich countries.  Second, it probes the 
EFW’s Legal Structure and Property Rights’ discriminant validity from outside measures 
intended to capture good governance.  I examine 138 countries using data from the EFW 
(Gwartney et al. 2010) and the World Bank’s Governance Indicators (GI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2009).  I use countries mean EFW and GI scores for the 1995 – 2008 period, using 
linear interpolation to estimate scores in years in which either the EFW or GI were assessed. 
First, the analysis attempts to show that the rich world, whose embrace of market 
capitalism serves as a basis for advising other countries to liberalize, does not maximize 
liberalism and good governance across the board.  While both good governance and free markets 
are present in healthy doses in wealthy countries, much of the OECD resists several forms of 
liberalization.  My attempt to classify these liberalization-governance variations is pursued 
through complete-linkage hierarchical cluster analysis, which works to differentiate groups by 
progressively agglomerating individual observations into groups by collecting them according to 
farthest Euclidian (L2) distances between groups (Kaufman and Rousseeuw 1990; Everitt et al. 
2011).  In other words, it collects observations into groups by iteratively aggregating them to 
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produce maximally-different groups in a multidimensional space (defined by the variables used 
in the cluster analysis). 
To test whether the Legal Structure index measures free markets or governance quality, I  
use confirmatory factor analysis.  Warner (2008: Ch. 18) provides an overview of this method, 
and compares it with the exploratory factor-analytical method used by Caudill, Zanella and 
Mixon (2000).  In addition to not addressing the implications of governance factors (due to their 
then-absence in the EFW), Caudill, Zanella and Mixon’s (2000) use of exploratory factor 
analysis is a data-driven exercise, and vulnerable to Type I error (the analyst’s identification of 
factors that may not exist empirically).  Such analyses, according to Warner, are vulnerable to 
“over-interpretation” (p. 814), rooted in the analyst having mistaken exploratory factor analysis’ 
findings as real-world categories.  Confirmatory factor analysis provides a somewhat stronger 
method for assessing measurement models, which employs a priori data categorizations based 
on theory and tests the significance of these a priori grouping’s ability to predict relationships 
among variables.  In other words, confirmatory factor analysis exposes data groupings to the 
possibility of being rejected. 
To assess whether the EFW is substantially discrepant from other governance measures 
that do not directly imply market capitalism, I include outside data from Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi’s (2009) Governance Indicators (GI).  The GI is comprised of six composite indices 
designed to capture various aspects of “good governance.”  They are detailed in Table 2 below. 
[Insert Table 2] 
In the factor analysis, the GI Rule of Law and Control of Corruption indices were deemed 
a priori to have too much conceptual overlap with measured used to construct the EFW Legal 
System & Property Rights sub-index.  All three measures involve assessing the degree to which 
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governments are non-corrupt and secure an orderly, rule-bound economic environment.  To 
avoid stacking the deck in favor of not finding differences between the Legal Structure index and 
GI measures, the GI Rule of Law and Control of Corruption indices were excluded from the 
factor analyses.  The decision is taken to be conservative, as both indices are highly correlated 
with the EFW Legal System sub-index and hence have a likelihood of pushing analytical results 
towards identifying the latter as a governance-related factor.  The GI Regulatory Quality 
component was deemed to provide a commentary on policy rather than governance, and 
specifically concentrates on the empowerment of the private sector.  My intent is to distinguish 
strongly between policy (specifically, liberalism) and more strictly non-policy economic 
governance metrics. 
3. National Models of Capitalism  
The EFW’s annual reports emphasize the fact that the world’s richest countries are also 
its most liberal ones.  This relationship is presented as a reason for encouraging developing 
countries to liberalize (Gwartney et al. 2010).  The basic idea underlying this prescription is that 
poor countries can become wealthy by emulating rich ones, a contestable proposition that has 
been criticized by in several corners of the literature (for reviews, see Chirot and T. D. Hall 
1982; Easterly 2002).  I bracket these concerns, and instead propose that the rich world offers a 
variety of national economic models that embrace liberal markets to varying degrees (see also P. 
A. Hall and Soskice 2001).  Recommending that countries maximize their conformity to free 
market principles is not recommending that they use policies characteristic of all rich countries, 
but rather those used in the English-speaking subset of the OECD. 
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Table 4 (below) presents the pairwise correlations between the five EFW sub-indexes and 
the six GI governance indexes.  With the exception of the EFW’s Size of Government indicator, 
these indexes’ strong correlations suggest that liberalism and governance quality occur in 
tandem.  Such a finding suggests that they are indeed part of the same general policy package. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The negative relationship between the Size of Government measure and other indicators 
could be the product of Wagner’s Law, a propensity for wealthier economies to have larger 
government budgets relative to GDP (Peacock and Scott 2000).  For present purposes, this 
discrepancy is treated as non-problematic because the construct is thematically similar to the 
basic underlying concept of “freedom” as reduced government, and thus enjoys strong face 
validity. Smaller government can be treated as a form of limited government, even if the wealthy 
do not embrace it. 
All of the other measured indicators have strong relationships.  Note that the GI 
governance indexes are highly correlated with each other, and with the EFW Legal System & 
Property Rights index.  Curiously, the individual GI indicators’ relationship with other EFW 
indicators seems slightly stronger than the relationships among EFW indicators.  This 
observation is possibly a product of wealthy advanced economies being generally well-governed, 
but having a propensity to pick-and-choose their forms of liberalism. 
A variation in rich countries’ adoption of liberalism is suggested by cluster analyses. 
Figure 1 (below) presents a dendrogram describing the results of a cluster analysis that used 
average annual scores for EFW and GI indicators in 20 OECD countries.  The purpose of cluster 
analysis is to identify distinct groups of countries that show similar combinations of 
liberalization policies and governance characteristics within groups, but distinct combinations 
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from other groups.  Countries linked by lower-order branches in this chart are deemed to be more 
similar in terms of their liberalism-governance profiles.   
[Insert Figure 1] 
The cluster analysis sorts these countries into five sizeable groups.  The first, which will 
be termed the “Anglo” model, comprises the English-speaking OECD countries and Switzerland.  
The second group (the “Continental” model), includes most of the Northern European Union 
members, although France and Sweden stand out as a variant of this policy model.  
Mediterranean European countries and Japan appear as a third cluster.   
To discern the character of these groups, Table 4 (below) presents the median EFW and 
GI scores for 1995 – 2008. 
[Insert Table 4] 
The Anglo countries are the world’s “freest” countries, with overall EFW scores that are 
significantly higher1 than other regions depicted in the table.  This group’s standout scores are 
not the product of sound money or free trade, which are statistically indistinguishable from 
Continental economies.  The defining characteristic of these economies is their relatively small 
governments and strong embrace of deregulation, both of which are significantly higher than in 
other regions.  Interestingly, the Anglo cluster has significantly lower Legal System scores than 
the remainder of the OECD. 
The Continental model of capitalism offers an alternative to the Anglo model.  As a 
group, they are significantly less liberal but significantly better-governed.  Whereas the Anglo 
countries seek to maximize liberalism, the Continental models eschew government reduction and 
                                                           
1
 According to pairwise t-tests for differences in group means.  Here, “significant” differences are those whose t-
tests suggest a probability of greater than 95% that group means are different. 
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deregulation while maximizing good governance.  The Franco-Swiss variant of the Continental 
model’s defining characteristic appears to be very large governments and weaker governance 
quality, but they are otherwise similar to Continental countries. 
The Mediterranean OECD and Japan is more weakly governed and more tightly 
regulated.   
Thus, when policy-makers are advised to embrace “economic freedom”, they are 
implicitly being asked to follow an Anglo economic model.  Presumably, embracing this model 
pays off in clearer gains in economic welfare.  In all likelihood, there are different benefits 
involved in pursuing the Anglo strategy versus the Continental models – maximizing liberalism 
and governance versus maximizing governance but setting limits to markets’ reach.  The point 
being made here is that, if we do not differentiate liberalism from good governance, we cannot 
explore these differences.  We end up lumping all of the rich world’s policy strategies into a 
common category called “freedom”.  These comparisons suggest that a choice ultimately 
presents itself to policy-makers: whether to go “all the way” with liberalism or seek to limit it 
once it reaches some minimal level.  The developing world need not hold up the English-
speaking OECD as the only model to pursue development.  Europe offers an alternative model 
that merits consideration. 
Such a lumping process can shape our understanding of real world policy dilemmas.  The 
overall EFW index of distressed European countries like Greece, Italy, Spain or Portugal 
suggests that their economies are suffering because they are illiberal.  However, a closer look at 
the deconstructed index reveals that their public sectors are generally less far-reaching than other 
European countries (as indicated by their higher – or “freer” – Size of Government index).  They 
are slightly more closed to trade and have a greater penchant for regulation.  However, their 
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governance scores are markedly lower as well.  So exactly what is ailing Europe’s southern 
countries?  Is it that their markets are less liberal, or that their governments are generally less 
accountable, stable, professional and free from corruption?  While answers to these questions 
cannot be established here, the fact remains that we cannot even begin to contemplate them if we 
fail to differentiate between good-quality governance and free markets, which is what happens 
when you rate countries based on one metric that encapsulates both concepts. 
4. What Concept Does the Legal System & Property Rights Sub-Index 
Capture? 
Given the possibility that liberalism and governance represent distinct agenda, even if 
they are both found in good measure among the rich countries, the next question to be addressed 
concerns the EFW’s Legal System & Property Rights sub-index.  Does it represent good 
governance or free market capitalism?  One way to address this question is to ask whether high 
Legal System scores are more often found in economically liberal or well-governed countries.  
This question can be addressed via factor analysis.  The analyses presented below find that a 
strong legal system and secure property rights are found in both liberal and well-governed 
countries, but that the measure seems more closely related to good governance. 
Figure 2 presents a graphical depiction of the model being tested.  Two latent concepts 
(denoted by circles) are theorized to be captured by the EFW and GI empirical measures 
(denoted by boxes): Liberalism and Governance.  The arrows from the latent to measured 
variables denote the relationship between observed measurements and their underlying, latent 
theoretical constructs.  The coefficient of these measures is denoted by lambdas (λ).  The dotted 
line from the Liberalism latent measure to the EFW Legal System & Property Rights index 
represents its use in one model, in which that measure is taken to be related to both Liberalism 
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and Governance.  Each measured variable (in boxes) in the model has an error term that is not 
drawn in the model for the sake of legibility.  The curved line between Liberalism and 
Governance, labeled with phi (φ), measures a relationship between the Liberalism and 
Governance constructs. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Table 3 (below) shows the results of two models.  The first model considers the Legal 
System & Property Rights measure that signals both Liberalism and Governance.  The second 
takes that measure to capture Governance only. 
[Insert Table 3] 
Model One assesses both the Liberalism and Governance construct, and considers the 
EFW Legal System & Property Rights index to be a potential predictor of both.  Its model fit 
meets the standards set by Hu and Bentler (1999): a standardized root mean square residual 
(SRMR) below 0.09 and Bentler’s Comparative Fit Index (CFI) of 0.96 or higher. 
Factor loadings for both the Liberalism and Governance latent variables are reasonably 
similar and significant, except for the Legal System measure, which registers an insignificant, 
negative coefficient for Liberalism.  I test the effects of removing the relationship between 
Liberalism and the Legal System indicator in Model Two.  Other factor loadings seem to be 
minimally affected.  SRMR and CFI statistics remain adequate.  The BIC fit statistic suggests a 
better model fit.   
Both models suggest a strong relationship between liberalism and governance.  They can 
reasonably be construed as two facets of an overall “development” process.  The analysis 
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suggests that the Legal System measure pertains to the latter.  It is a governance quality measure, 
not a measure of liberalism. 
5. Conclusion 
The EFW advocates policy-makers’ embrace of “economic freedom” on the grounds that 
it is a defining characteristic of the world’s richest countries, and marshals the support of an 
index measuring “freedom” in support of that proposition.  The notion that the world’s richest 
countries are the “freest” is true, but some care should be taken when considering what 
“economic freedom” means in empirical, rather than nominal, terms.  Free markets, fair courts 
and a strong legal system are all present in these objects of emulation, but lumping these 
concepts together imparts the impression that they are all expressions of a single policy project.   
They are not.  “Economic freedom” is an amalgam of at least two distinct concepts: free 
markets and good governance, not to mention a possible third factor – inflation – lurking in the 
Sound Money component.  Attempting to maximize both is not an act of emulating the entire rich 
world, but rather one that emulates primarily the English-speaking rich world.  By separating 
free markets from good governance, we can see that alternatives models of capitalism exist.  
Indeed, much of the European Union has secured world-class governance while embracing 
liberalization more haltingly. 
Of course, whether or not the Continental European model should be emulated is a matter 
of debate.  The net benefit of pursuing either of these models of capitalism, or other ones, is an 
empirical question.  The main point is that, if we do not distinguish free markets from good 
governance, such questions will not even be entertained.  Governance and liberalism may have 
different effects on different policy goals, and an exploration of these differences may provide 
very useful information that can shape countries’ policy priorities. 
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Aside from the fact that the rich world offers distinct models of capitalism, there are other 
reasons to keep questions of free markets separate from those of good governance.  First, there 
are issues related to reform sequencing.  If a strong and fair legal system does represent a 
structure requirement necessary for markets to work well, does it make sense to liberalize an 
economy in their absence?  The “liberalization first” strategy was employed in both Latin 
America and the transitioning Soviet Union, and rendered disappointing results in many respects.  
These policy failures may suggest that dangers lurk in treating governance and liberalism as part 
of a common policy package. 
Second, there are instances in which liberalism and good governance could work at cross-
purposes in the pursuit of macroeconomic goals.  There may be instances in which too much 
democracy, political stability or bureaucratic control could mitigate the benefits of market 
liberalization.  The EFW was originally rooted in the view that political liberalization could 
ultimately undermine development if it led to populist policies that destroy incentives to invest 
and produce.  Likewise, there are conceivable circumstances in which policy-makers may deem 
it important to pursue specific initiatives, even at the cost of sowing political discontent or 
overriding bureaucrats. 
Likewise, too much liberalism could hurt macroeconomic gains that accrue as a result of 
a well-managed government.  Unpopular liberalization policies can disrupt political order too 
much, or a penchant for overruling or neglecting a bureaucracy in the interests of short-term 
policy objectives may cause problems that hurt development over the long-term.  In addition, 
there are circumstances in which markets really need government oversight – the 2008 global 
financial crisis being an obvious potential example.  Where countries lack effective governments, 
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they may be at the mercy of private (and often foreign) markets, which can lead to trouble when 
these markets’ interests diverge from those relative to general economic welfare. 
The data presented here suggest that – to the extent we can equate the rich world’s policy 
strategies with good policy for others – some measure of free markets and good governance is 
probably desirable, but these programs are not identical and should not be treated as such.  Those 
who engage the EFW should remain cognizant of the conceptual conflation that exists in its 
strategies to measure “freedom”, and take care to parse these separate issues when using the 
EFW as a basis for making policy prescriptions. 
  
19 
 
Works Cited 
Ayal, E.B., and G. Karras. 1998. “Components of economic freedom and growth: an empirical 
study.” The Journal of Developing Areas 32(3):327–338. 
Berggren, Niclas. 2003. “The Benefits of Economic Freedom: A Survey.” The Independent 
Review 8(2):193 - 211. 
Berggren, Niclas, and H. Jordahl. 2005. “Does free trade really reduce growth? Further testing 
using the economic freedom index.” Public Choice 122(1):99–114. 
Burki, Shahid Javed, and Guillermo Perry. 1998. Beyond the Washington consensus: institutions 
matter. World Bank Publications. 
Campbell, D.T., and D.W. Fiske. 1959. “Convergent and discriminant validation by the 
multitrait-multimethod matrix.” Psychological bulletin 56(2):81. 
Carlsson, F., and Susanna Lundström. 2002. “Economic freedom and growth: Decomposing the 
effects.” Public Choice 112(3):335–344. 
Caudill, S.B., F.C. Zanella, and F.G. Mixon. 2000. “Is economic freedom one dimensional? A 
factor analysis of some common measures of economic freedom.” Journal of Economic 
Development 25(1):17–40. 
Centeno, Miguel A., and Joseph N. Cohen. forth. “The Arc of Neoliberalism.” Annual Review of 
Sociology. 
Chirot, D., and T.D. Hall. 1982. “World-system theory.” Annual Review of Sociology 81–106. 
Cohen, Joseph N. 2011. “‘Economic Freedom’ and Economic Growth: Questioning the Claim 
that Freer Markets Make Societies More Prosperous.” Unpublished manuscript under 
review. 
Doucouliagos, C., and M. A Ulubasoglu. 2006. “Economic freedom and economic growth: Does 
specification make a difference?” European Journal of Political Economy 22(1):60–81. 
Easterly, William Russell. 2002. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and 
Misadventures in the Tropics. MIT Press. 
Edwards, Sebastian. 1995. Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope. A World 
Bank Publication. 
Evans, Peter, and J. E Rauch. 1999. “Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the 
effects of‘ Weberian’ state structures on economic growth.” American Sociological 
Review 64(5):748–765. 
Everitt, Brian S., Sabine Landau, Morven Leese, and Dr Daniel Stahl. 2011. Cluster Analysis. 
John Wiley and Sons. 
20 
 
Gwartney, James D., Joshua Hall, and Robert Lawson. 2010. Economic Freedom of the World: 
2010 Annual Report. Vancouver: Frasier Institute. 
De Haan, Jakob, Susanna Lundström, and J. E Sturm. 2006. “Market-oriented institutions and 
policies and economic growth: A critical survey.” Journal of Economic Surveys 
20(2):157–191. 
Hall, Peter A., and David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press. 
Harvey, David. 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press. 
Heckelman, J.C., and M.D. Stroup. 2000. “Whcich Economic Freedoms Contribute to Growth?” 
Kyklos 53(4):527–544. 
Justesen, M.K. 2008. “The effect of economic freedom on growth revisited: New evidence on 
causality from a panel of countries 1970-1999.” European Journal of Political Economy 
24(3):642–660. 
Kaufman, L., and P.J. Rousseeuw. 1990. Finding groups in data: an introduction to cluster 
analysis. Wiley Online Library. 
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi. 2009. “Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and 
individual governance indicators, 1996–2008.” World. 
Kolodko, Grzegorz W. 2000. From Shock to Therapy: The Political Economy of Postsocialist 
Transformation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Peacock, A., and A. Scott. 2000. “The curious attraction of Wagner’s law.” Public Choice 
102(1):1–17. 
Polak, J.J. 1991. The changing nature of IMF conditionality. International Finance Section, Dept. 
of Economics, Princeton University. 
Rodrik, Dani. 1996. “Understanding economic policy reform.” Journal of Economic Literature 
34(1):9–41. 
Roland, Gérard. 2001. “Ten Years after ... Transition and Economics.” IMF Staff Papers 48:29-
52. Retrieved September 23, 2011. 
Staehr, K. 2005. “Reforms and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Complementarity, 
Sequencing and Speed.” European Journal of Comparative Economics 2(2):177–202. 
Sumner, S. 2004. “How Have Monetary Regime Changes Affected the Popularity of IS-LM?” 
History of Political Economy 36(Suppl 1):240. 
Tures, J. A. 2003. “Economic Freedom and Conflict Reduction: Evidence from the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s.” Journal article by John A. Tures; The Cato Journal 22. 
21 
 
Williamson, John. 1990. “What Washington means by policy reform” edited by John 
Williamson. Latin American adjustment: how much has happened 7–20. 
Yergin, Daniel, and Joseph Stanislaw. 2002. The Commanding Heights : The Battle for the 
World Economy. Rev Upd Su. Free Press. 
22 
 
Table 1: Constituent Sub-Indices of EFW 
Component Conditions that Enhance “Freedom” 
Size of Government 
Expenditures, Taxes 
and Enterprises 
Low government consumption, transfers, subsidies, investment 
and enterprise ownership, and low taxes. 
Freedom to Trade 
Internationally 
Low and invariant tariffs, low regulatory trade barriers, formal 
market-determined exchange rates, relatively large trade 
sectors, low capital market controls 
Regulation of Credit, 
Labor and Business 
Private banking, openness to international banking, private 
sector-directed credit, low interest rate controls, minimum 
wages, regulatory compliance costs, prevalence of centralized 
collective bargaining, price controls, need to pay bribes or 
military conscription. 
Access to Sound 
Money 
Low and invariable inflation, low growth in M1 money supply, 
no restrictions on foreign currency bank accounts 
Legal Structure & 
Security of Property 
Rights 
Independent judiciary, impartial courts, protection of property 
rights, no military interference in politics or courts, rule of law, 
legal enforcement of contracts, low regulation on real estate 
 Source:  Gwartney, Hall and Lawson (2010) 
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Table 2: Governance Indicators IV Indices: Nominal Definitions 
Indicator Definition 
Voice & Accountability Citizens’ ability to participate in selecting government, 
freedom of expression, freedom of association and free 
media 
Political Stability & the 
Absence of Violence 
Likelihood that government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism 
Rule of Law Agents have confidence in and abide by rules of society, 
particularly in contract enforcement, property rights, 
police, courts and likelihood of crime and violence 
Control of Corruption Public power is not exercised for private gain, and state is 
not captured by elites or private interests 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Quality of public services, civil service and degree of 
independence from political pressures, quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and credibility of 
government commitment to such policies 
Regulatory Quality Ability of government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development. 
        Source:  Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2007) 
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Table 3: Pairwise Correlations, EFW & GI Indicator Annual Means, 1995 - 2006, 148 Countries 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) EFW Size of Government 1.000 
(2) EFW Legal Structure -0.239 1.000 
(3) EFW Sound Money 0.060 0.635 1.000 
(4) EFW Freedom to Trade -0.052 0.584 0.634 1.000 
(5) EFW Regulation 0.108 0.623 0.570 0.555 1.000 
(6) GI Voice -0.150 0.742 0.615 0.573 0.557 1.000 
(7) GI Political Stability -0.178 0.837 0.578 0.570 0.585 0.788 1.000 
(8) GI Govt. Effectiveness -0.217 0.918 0.693 0.645 0.610 0.835 0.821 1.000 
(9) GI Rule of Law -0.227 0.935 0.691 0.607 0.596 0.839 0.856 0.973 1.000 
(10) GI Control of Corr. -0.225 0.908 0.668 0.584 0.601 0.817 0.819 0.970 0.971 1.000 
(11) GI Regulatory Quality -0.107 0.868 0.745 0.728 0.651 0.858 0.817 0.955 0.942 0.927 1.000 
  
 
Table 4: Mean EFW and GI Scores by OECD Clusters 
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Anglo 8.11 6.57 9.54 7.82 7.99 8.69 1.43 0.99 1.77 1.69 1.89 1.60 
Continental 7.50 4.06 9.52 7.93 7.18 8.93 1.54 1.23 1.96 1.83 2.15 1.57 
France & Belgium 7.22 4.06 9.62 8.05 6.91 7.54 1.30 0.81 1.64 1.35 1.38 1.17 
Spain, Portugal & Japan 7.29 5.77 9.56 7.24 6.64 7.37 1.16 0.78 1.25 1.22 1.21 1.09 
Greece & Italy 6.83 5.64 9.32 7.28 5.76 6.34 1.00 0.62 0.77 0.75 0.52 0.89 
Total 7.59 5.35 9.52 7.74 7.21 8.22 1.36 0.97 1.64 1.53 1.68 1.40 
 
  
  
Table 5: Confirmatory Factor Analysis, Liberalism and Governance 
  Estimate Std Err. Z-Value Estimate Std Err Z-Value 
λ11 Freedom  Sound Money 0.810 0.075 10.875 1.277 0.119 10.839 
λ12 Freedom  Regulation 0.721 0.078 9.237 0.798 0.095 9.324 
λ12 Freedom  Free Trade 0.769 0.076 10.086 0.955 0.086 10.036 
λ14 Freedom  Legal System -0.105 0.111 -0.950    
λ21 Governance  Legal System 1.032 0.122 8.470 1.650 0.113 15.616 
λ22 Governance  Voice 0.846 0.069 12.243 0.772 0.063 12.289 
λ23 Governance  Pol. Stability 0.865 0.068 12.629 0.771 0.061 12.564 
λ24 Governance  Govt. Eff 0.972 0.063 15.545 0.949 0.061 15.616 
e1 Sound Money  0.344 0.058 5.879 0.863 0.146 5.892 
e2 Regulation 0.480 0.069 6.932 0.573 0.083 6.921 
e3 Free Trade 0.409 0.063 6.468 0.642 0.100 6.495 
e4 Legal System 0.104 0.020 5.146 0.376 0.061 6.163 
e5 Voice 0.284 0.038 7.516 0.233 0.031 7.565 
e6 Pol. Stability 0.253 0.035 7.119 0.205 0.029 7.032 
e7 Govt. Eff. 0.054 0.016 3.388 0.047 0.015 3.184 
φ Governance  Liberalism 0.873 0.035 25.204 0.867 0.035 24.981 
 Model Chi-Sq (df) 43.198 (12) 44.17 (13) 
 SRMR 0.023 0.023 
 CFI 0.964 0.964 
 BIC -15.929 -19.884 
 
 
  
  
 
Figure 1: Dendrogram of Cluster Analysis of EFW and GI Indices in OECD, 1995 - 2006 
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Figure 2: Diagram of Confirmatory Factor Analysis Model 
 
 
 
